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ABSTRACT 
Demographic change presents major financing problems for the pay-as-you-go pension 
system. In response to these problems, the 2001 and 2004 German pension reforms reduced 
the statutory level of benefits from the pay-as-you system. The resulting pension gap is 
supposed to be filled by funded second and third pillar private pensions. This paper examines 
the extent to which households are in a position today to close this gap with their personal 
assets, assuming that they stick to their current saving and asset accumulation behaviour. Four 
critical factors are relevant to this issue: 1. the anticipated life expectancy, 2. the level of 
personal assets on retirement 3. the expected age of retirement, and 4. the anticipated interest 
rate. Our results indicate that about a third of German households will not be able to fill the 
pension gap unless they were to change their current savings behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
The process of demographic change, and the fact that the benefits of a growing proportion of 
pensioners must be financed by fewer and fewer contributors, poses major problems for the 
German pay-as-you-go pension scheme. For this reason, the 2001 pension reform entailed a 
reduction in the level of statutory pensions and strengthened the funded second and third pillars 
of old-age pension provision. Financial incentives aimed at encouraging the accumulation of 
additional pension provision were introduced to enable contributors and pensioners to maintain 
current levels of old-age pension provision. Private, funded pension provision is less sensitive to 
demographic developments than pay-as-you-go state systems and, what is more, the 
accumulation process allows burdens to be spread more evenly across the generations than in the 
PAYG system. This means that the baby-boom generation will be in a position to prefinance part 
of their old-age pension provision. The calculations performed by the Rürup Commission on the 
basis of revised assumptions revealed that demographic developments will have a far more 
serious impact on the financial standing of the pension system than originally supposed at the 
time the Riester reform was introduced.1 As a result, an increasingly important role is set to be 
played by supplementary private provision in the future. 
The aim of partially replacing part of the first pillar of pension provision with voluntary private 
supplementary provision is an entirely new approach to the pension issue in Germany. At this 
juncture, so soon after the introduction of the Riester pension, there is little evidence available 
about how well accepted or how effective this measure has been. In the first year after the 
Riester pension scheme was introduced, around 5 million policies subject to state bonus were 
concluded, of which three million were private and two million occupational pension policies. 
Only one in five of manual and white-collar workers in the core 20 to 45 age group have so far 
taken out a policy and only a further 18 percent plan to do so (Schnabel 2003). These figures 
                                                 
1 Commission on the long-term financial viability of the German social security system, referred to in brief in the 
following as the Rürup Commission.. 
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have so far failed to come up to expectations. However, experience with similar pension 
products (such as Individual Retirement Accounts in the USA) in other countries suggests that 
similar supplementary pension products are not successful from one day to the next but require 
after a lengthy introductory period extending over several years. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of deficits in the current framework of private pension provision which probably impede 
the rapid acceptance of such policies on a large scale; discussion of reform proposals to address 
these problems is already underway.2  
Two risks are inherent in the introduction of supplementary private pensions. On the one hand, 
the voluntary nature of supplementary pension provision represents a risk. It is by no means 
certain that households – and particularly low-income households – are willing and/or able to set 
aside additional savings for old age on a consistent basis. Empirical findings confirm that lower-
income groups are less willing and able to make additional savings for their old-age pensions, 
and that this is exacerbated by these groups being less well informed about financial matters 
(Bulmahn 2003). However, it is precisely the households in this group – a group which as a rule 
can expect to receive a relatively low state pension, in many cases a very modest additional 
occupational pension, and which also has very few significant assets at its disposal – which 
would be most in need of additional sources of income in old age. The high rates of cancellation 
of building society contracts and whole life insurance policies – despite the high losses which 
such cancellations imply owing to low surrender values and up-front sales commission – suggest 
that there is also a very real risk that private old-age pension schemes may also be terminated.3 
While they are less damaging than cancellations, periods in which people find themselves in 
straitened financial circumstances – owing to unemployment, loss of earnings, or if they stay at 
home to bring up children – and consequently suspend payments to such schemes for a period of 
time are also of great significance as well as being highly probable. 
A further risk – the reverse side of the opportunities involved – is the rate of return on policy 
contributions. While the rate of return on contributions to the pay-as-you-go system corresponds 
to the growth rate for total wages and the population, the rate of return on payments to private 
pension schemes is determined by interest rates on the capital market, whereby individual capital 
returns depend on the success or otherwise of specific investment vehicles. The critics of funded 
                                                 
2 Refer, for example, to the discussion by Fehr, Kiesewetter and Myßen – “The Riester pension – a flop” in ifo-
Schnelldienst 5/2003, the Bertelsmannstiftung Pension Report (2003), the proposals submitted by the Independent 
Expert Commission on Tax Reform and the proposals of the Rürup Commission. 
3 A survey in 2002 revealed, in Germany, that only 50 percent of policies are maintained through to the agreed term. 
Policies are most frequently cancelled shortly before people – in the 55-64 age group - enter retirement. The most 
frequently cited reasons are debts (26%), divorce (16%) and unemployment (13%) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). 
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private pension provision emphasise the risk to which financial investments are subject, 
particularly in view of the recent performance of the capital market. One cause of concern is the 
so-called “asset meltdown” hypothesis according to which demographic developments will result 
in a significant decrease in demand for financial assets and consequently in the capital returns on 
such assets. The pertinent calculations do, however, demonstrate that the portents for a 
demographically-induced fall in rates of return are by no means as gloomy as predicted in the 
popular press (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, Sommer 2003).4 Nonetheless, the situation on capital 
markets since 2001 provides an unmistakable warning that lengthy periods of below-average, or 
even negative, capital returns are certainly a danger to be reckoned with. 
Both of the risks referred to above have been investigated by Essig and Reil-Held (2003), who 
came to the conclusion that consistent savings towards private pension provision will be essential 
in the future in order to maintain living standards in retirement. 
This paper examines whether households are in a position to close the gap in provision created 
by the reduction in statutory retirement pensions without changing their current patterns of 
behaviour, i.e. by continuing to save as they are doing at present. In this context, expectations 
regarding life span and retirement age play a decisive role; both these factors determine the 
requisite payout volume that needs to be covered by accumulated savings. The age of retirement 
coincides with the end of the savings phase available to households. 
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 examines anticipated life spans. This section 
compares subjective life expectancy with the latest mortality tables published by the Federal 
Statistical Office and checks the validity and consistency of the results. Section 3 examines 
household assets according to their composition and volume as well as the level of assets 
available to such households at the onset of retirement. Section 4 calculates the statutory pension 
entitlements of households before and after the two reforms of 2001 and 2003. Section 5 presents 
the key results of our analysis: the potential payout from private assets is compared with the 
benefits provided by the public retirement insurance system. The degree to which the new 
pension gap can be closed over a pensioner’s entire period of retirement is then assessed. Section 
6 highlights the results of this study in summarised form and presents recommendations for 
economic policy. 
This paper exploits data collected in the framework of the SAVE panel. The first wave of the 
panel was conducted in 2001 (cf. Börsch-Supan and Essig 2002) and new surveys are due to be 
                                                 
4 Owing to demographic factors, overall capital market returns will fall by around one percentage point, assuming 
diversification within the EU region (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Sommer 2003). 
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performed every two years. An additional important variable – precise subjective life expectancy 
- was required for this paper and a further interview round was conducted in June 2004 for this 
purpose. Appendix 1 explains the structure of SAVE in more detail and presents the various sub-
samples which go together to make up the SAVE panel. This paper draws on two of these sub-
samples: one referred to in the following as TPI 20045, which contains the date on subjective life 
expectancy, and Random Route (RR) 20036, which represents the largest and very latest SAVE 
subsample. 
SAVE is a household survey. Values such as savings, assets and income are therefore assigned to 
households as a whole rather than to individuals. This requires yet another assumption if individ-
ual variables such as age, age of retirement or life expectancy are to be related to household size. 
The assumption made is that, except in the case of households headed by a single woman, the 
head of household is always a man. This means that calculations at the household level are based 
on the life expectancy and anticipated age of retirement of the male head of household. 
 
2. Life expectancy and anticipated age of retirement 
A key component in the analysis of individual savings behaviour is subjective life expectancy. 
Individual subjective life expectancy is approximated statistically in a large number of mi-
croeconometric studies. This imposes the restriction on the approximations that individuals adapt 
their behaviour in line with observable statistical variables, such as survival probability in a life 
cycle model of consumption. There are two objections to this approximation. On the one hand, 
we might expect changes in life expectancy which cannot be found in the mortality tables as the 
latter, owing to their design, respond only slowly to environmental changes. On the other hand, 
the assumption of constant life expectancies for each cohort and sex ignores differences between 
individuals which certainly can be reflected in subjective life expectancy and which can lead to a 
corresponding change in behaviour. This means that it is easier to explain individual behaviour if 
these subjective differences can be integrated in the estimates; cf. Hurd and McGarry (1997). In 
order to take this into account, SAVE ascertains the individual life expectancy of the respondent 
and their partner by deploying a three-step question (cf. Appendix). The following analysis looks 
                                                 
5 The abbreviation is derived from a subsidiary of TNS Infratest, the Wetzlar-based test panel institute which main-
tains a permanent panel (“access”) from which this subsample was taken. 
 
6 Random Route refers to a method in which households are selected at random from a sampling frame with a spe-
cific starting point and continuing along a specified route. A frequently used method for the selection of sampling 
households. 
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at the extent to which these subjective results are comparable with the mortality tables of the 
Federal Statistical Office and how the results of various questions asked in 2001 and 2003 com-
pare with those for the year 2004. The factors influencing individual life expectancy are also de-
termined. 
Owing to its complexity this topic needs to be dealt with in considerably more detail. As referred 
to at the beginning of this paper, life expectancies play an important role in old-age pension pro-
vision. We will return to this issue again in Section 5. 
2.1 A comparison of SAVE IV descriptives and official statistics 
Asking respondents about their subjective life expectancy puts such people in the unpleasant 
situation of having to think about their own mortality. A striking feature of the post-interview 
comments offered by respondents is that these questions are felt to be more personal and 
disquieting than questions about their wealth and assets. While this is not reflected in people’s 
willingness to respond – which at over 96% is in fact extremely high – their comments do 
suggest that this subject needs to be approached with a degree of caution. For this reason a multi-
phase process was used to ascertain to what age respondents and their partners believe they will 
live. The first question asked was to what age the respondents believed men and women in the 
same cohort lived on average7. The next question was whether the respondents believed they 
themselves would live longer or shorter than the average for their cohort, followed by the request 
to express this difference in years. Respondents were then presented with four possible 
explanations for why they thought they would live longer or shorter lives than the average. 8 
Individual life expectancy is derived from the average age at death stated by respondents and the 
difference in years between this average age and the age to which they expected to live. 
The interview procedure was repeated in the same way with the respondent’s partner. 
                                                 
7 Cf. Figure 1, and Table 1 which shows the average anticipated life expectancy of men and women. 
8 One option was an open field in which other reasons could be entered. 
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Figure 1: Average life expectancy by sex 
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Note: Values weighted according to age and income. 
Source: SAVE TPI 2004 
 
Figure 1 shows the differences in the anticipated average age at death of men and women. Most 
of the responses are concentrated around the so-called focal points9 between age 70 and 85; in 
the case of women, there is a discernible shift in the age estimates to the right. The modal value 
is 80 in both distributions, however. Table 1 summarises the results in descriptive form. 
Table 1: Average life expectancy by sex 
 Men Women 
Mean value 76.71 80.70 
Median 76 80 
Standard error 0.25 0.25 
Mortality table values 2000/2002 75.38 81.22 
Note: Weighted according to age and income. 
Source: SAVE TPI 2004 
 
The mean values for average life expectancy by sex in SAVE are fairly close to the values in the 
mortality tables drawn up by the Federal Statistical Office; with a difference of 0.5 years, the life 
expectancy of women approximates very closely in both sets of data. The difference in life 
expectancy between men and women is underestimated, however. The difference of 3.99 years is 
1.85 years less than that in the mortality tables. It is striking, however, that the differences in the 
absolute values between the individual and mortality table values are as small as they are given 
that 75.38 or 81.22 years of age are the life expectancy values for people born in the year 2002, 
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while the SAVE survey asked for the anticipated life expectancy of people of the same age. In 
combination, Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate what households understand by individual life 
expectancy. The longevity figures which typically find their way into the media reflect the 
projected life expectancy of the recently born, and because these life expectancy values are based 
on period mortality tables they are entirely fictitious, with the life expectancy of newborns being 
thrown into the equation with the same weight as that of a centenarian.10 Mortality in 100 years 
is unlikely to be same as it is today.11 At the same time, lifespan and remaining life expectancy 
figures which are based on mortaliy tables suggest that life expectancy actually increases as 
people grow older.12 This is due to the interaction of two opposing effects. On the one hand, the 
cohort effect - which implies lower life expectancy for older birth cohorts and thus for people 
who are already in the older age groups – means that life expectancy declines in old age. On the 
other hand, by the age of 50, for example, people have already survived a number of risks (infant 
mortality, the risks of various illnesses). People who have already lived longer than the average 
expected lifespan, for example, will also have significantly higher overall life expectancy. 
There are therefore two effects which lead to an underestimation of individual life expectancy. 
Firstly, life expectancy figures which are based on mortality tables merely describe current popu-
lation mortality. Secondly, respondents underestimate the effect of having already survived spe-
cific risks by the time they reach a certain age. Table 2, which shows individual life expectancy13 
according to age group, clearly demonstrates how the latter effect is neglected. Younger house-
holds anticipate living to a significantly older age than do older households. 
This underestimation of individual lifespans can lead to serious errors being made in the financ-
ing of retirement income. In this context, refer to Section 5. 
Table 2: Individual life expectancy (own and that of partner) by sex 
 Men 
 <30 30-39 40-49 50-59  60 and older All 
Mean value 81.41 77.86 75.18 73.51 78.86 76.80
Median 80 80 75 75 80 78 
Standard error 2.551 0.753 0.680 0.627 0.593 0.343
N 9 110 127 112 106 464 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Values which represent a multiple of a specific number, such as 10 or 5. 
10 Life expectancy at birth states the average number of years a specific group (men/women) will live if mortality 
rates remained unchanged throughout a newborn’s life. As a result, the construction of this value means that it en-
compasses all age groups. Cf. CIA factbook, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2102 
11 Refer to Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) who demonstrate a roughly linear increase in average life expectancy of 
around 0.25 years per year over the last 160 years. 
12 Refer to von Gaudecker (2004) for a discussion of various ratios and concepts for measuring life expectancy. 
13 This is average life expectancy ± individual difference. 
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Mortality table values 2000/2002a) 75.97 76.66 77.33 78.64 83.81 78.37
 Women 
Mean value 87.74 80.87 80.10 80.13 81.49 80.84
Median 85 80 80 80 81 80 
Standard error 2.422 0.619 0.640 0.540 0.547 0.291
N 5 98 112 110 101 426 
Mortality table values 2000/2002b) 81.69 82.03 82.42 83.22 87.06 87.06
Note: Weighted according to age and income. 
Source: SAVE TPI 2004 
a), b) a), b) The mortality table values increase as people grow older because they have already managed to survive 
to a specific age. The life expectancy of a centenarian, for example, is not 75.4 (as negative probabilities, like time 
machines, do not exist), but 101.96. 
 
Another interesting question is the extent to which the respondents believe that their income po-
sition exercises an influence on their individual life expectancy. Gaudecker (2004), for example, 
identifies socioeconomic status as the key factor explaining differences in mortality in Baden-
Württemberg, and Reil-Held (2000) uses Socio-Economic Panel data to show how income and 
life expectancy are linked. Table 3 shows that the differences between four income groups are 
negligible, however. In other words, the respondents do not associate an improved income situa-
tion with a lower mortality risk. 
Table 3: Individual life expectancy according to income quartiles 
  Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Men 
Mean value 76.58 75.72 77.16 77.03 
Median 77 75 76 76 
Standard error 0.76 0.84 0.87 0.85 
Number 102 79 79 81 
Women 
Mean value 81.8 79.84 80.3 81.82 
Median 85 80 80 80 
Standard error 0.97 1.71 1.25 0.65 
Number 28 23 37 36 
Note: Weighted according to age and income. 
Source: SAVE TPI 2004 
 
Another interesting question is whether there was a divergence in response behaviour between 
the years 2001 and 2004. While the question about average general life expectancy was changed 
(and respondents were asked for a specific figure rather than age groups), the question about 
relative individual life expectancy was identical at the time of both observations. 
Table 4 shows the figures produced by households or individual respondents in both years only 
in response to the question on relative life expectancies for the years 2001 and 2004. There may 
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be two reasons for changes in the information provided about respondents’ relative life situation. 
Certain things may well have actually changed in a respondent’s life, which represent new in-
formation for the estimation of a person’s individual life expectancy. On the other hand, re-
sponses may simply vary owing to the fact that a period of three years lies between both inter-
views. All in all, Table 4 shows that the assumptions regarding relative life expectancy are essen-
tially stable over time. Zaller (1992), for example, examined how opinions changed over a period 
of four months. The responses – selected from a choice of 5 categories (one of which, however, 
was a “don’t know” category) were identical in 48% of cases (cf. in this context the diagonals in 
Table 4.). 
Table 4: Comparison of relative and average life expectancya) 
 Relative life expectancy 2001 
Relative LEb) 2004 Shorter Exactly as long Longer Total 
Shorter  32 31 1 64 
 55.2% 8.9% 1.4% 13.4% 
Exactly as long 25 278 41 344 
 43.1% 79.7% 58.6% 72.1% 
Longer 1 40 28 69 
 1.7% 11.5% 40.0% 14.5% 
Total 58 349 70 477 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a), b) The precise wording of the question was: “If you think of your own situation and the state of your health, do 
you think that, in comparison to the men (if subject male) / women (if subject female) of your age group, you will 
live shorter, approximately as long as, or longer than the average?” 
Source: SAVE TPI 2001 and 2004; panel structure. 
 
The descriptive results and the discussion of the implications of results generated by mortality 
tables show that households tend to underestimate their own life expectancy. This is likely to 
prove a pleasant surprise in old age for some households – the surprise may however be accom-
panied in some cases by a recognition that one’s plans have been too short sighted. We will re-
turn to this issue later. 
 
2.2 Regression results 
The questions on precise subject life expectancy were asked for the first time in the SAVE sur-
vey in the TPI 2004 subsample. This subsample is about a quarter of the size of the RR 2003 
subsample, although the latter only surveyed general anticipated lifespans in relation to general 
life expectancy categories. This subsample can still be used if certain prerequisites are met, how-
ever, by imputing individual life expectancy data. This section therefore presents the regression 
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results from the TPI 2004 subsample; the dependent variable is the subjective life expectancy, 
explanatory variables are a set of observable individual and household characteristics. The esti-
mated coefficients of these regression results are therefore used in the same set of independent 
variables for subsample RR 2003 in order to impute individual life expectancies in the latter. 
Forecasting life expectancy would only be justified by the high explanatory power of the regres-
sion. The following analysis will show whether this can be reliably assumed. 
The multivariate regression analysis broadens the previous bivariate tables to enable the influ-
ence of a number of different factors to be measured at the same time. Our analysis includes po-
tential influencing factors such as permanent income14, age, educational and occupational vari-
ables, as well as further explanatory variables such as optimism, health expectations, and current 
or previous smoking behaviour. The results are detailed in Appendix 2 Table 23 (for respon-
dents) and Table 24 (for partners). Respondent variables were also used for the regression of the 
life expectancy of the partner, as the data was given by the respondent on behalf of the partner 
and the characteristics of the respondent could consequently influence the data provided for the 
partner. 
The results can be summarised as follows. The age effect is significant in both regressions, with 
age difference15 also being significant for the partner regression. Interestingly enough, income 
and education variables are not significant. This contradicts the findings of Gaudecker (2003), 
for example, according to which the influence of socio-economic status on mortality appeared to 
be strengthened or even caused by the level of educational attainment. Women have a considera-
bly longer life expectancy in both regressions, even more so in the regression for the partner (4.8 
vs. 3.4 years). While smokers are obviously not yet fully aware of the potential curtailing of their 
lifespan by their habit, the message seems to have got home to former smokers who anticipate 
living 1.2 years less than average. 
Also significant in the partner regression are the expectations regarding the development of re-
spondents’ own and their partners’ health situation. The effect of self-assessed optimism is also 
significant: the higher this value is (on a scale from 0 to 10), the higher life expectancy is. Four 
dummy variables offering possible explanations of relative life expectancy are also included, 
each with a high explanatory value of, on average, plus or minus four years. 
                                                 
14 The construct ‘permanent income’ is intended to eliminate potential transitory fluctuations in gross or net monthly 
income and to obtain a better planning variable for households. The method of estimating permanent income is 
based on the proposals of King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) and is described in more precise terms for the SAVE data 
in Essig (2004). 
15 This may reflect the hope that an older partner does not die before oneself. 
 12
In summary, the variables very effectively map individual life expectancy (50% for a small 
cross-section). Cohort effects of life expectancy are recognized, as shown in the overall negative 
significant age effect (with a minimum of 45 years), but not the opposite effect of risks which 
have already been survived by people who have reached a ripe old age (cf. Section 2.1). 
As referred to at the beginning of this section, imputed life expectancy in another subsample or 
data record is only legitimate if the regression has sufficient explanatory power. For a small 
cross-sectional analysis, the explanatory variable R2 is – at over 50% - very high. As explained 
in Appendix 1, we will broaden the basis of the data used to calculate the asset position, pension 
claims (and gaps in provision) at retirement age by drawing on the SAVE Random Route Sample 
2003 subsample. 
 
2.3 Anticipated age of retirement and replacement rates 
This section looks at the second variable determining the length of a person’s retirement - the an-
ticipated age of retirement. The age of retirement has been a protracted topic of discussion in 
Germany over the last twelve months as more and more observers have pointed out that the av-
erage age of retirement is too low. Table 5 shows the relevant figures from the Socio-Economic 
Panel and VDR, both of which demonstrate an age of retirement of 60 – significantly earlier than 
the state pension age of 65. The anticipated ages of retirement in SAVE are also shown, these be-
ing significantly higher than the current figures. 
Table 5: Actual and anticipated age of retirement 
  SOEP 1999a)   VDR 2001b)  SAVEc) 
     TPI 2001d) TPI 2004d)  RR 2003 
  Men Women   Men and women  Men Women  Men Women   Men Women
Mean 
value 59.7 60.7  60.2 63.1 61.7 64.4 62.9  63.3 63.0 
Median N/A N/A  N/A 65 60 65 64  65 65 
Std. dev. N/A N/A  N/A 3.19 3.01 2.55 3.14  4.09 3.79 
Std. error N/A N/A  N/A 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.34  0.18 0.14 
Number          223 92  203 84   547 702 
Note: Weighted according to age and income in SAVE; figures exclude freelance professionals and the self-
employed. 
a) Observed values Source: Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003) 
b) Observed values. Source: Own calculations / with grateful acknowledgement to Christina Benita Wilke for the 
data provided. 
c) Estimated values 
d) Panel comparison: Only households / respondents interviewed in both waves 
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The first SAVE survey was carried out before the introduction of the “Riester” pension scheme. 
Discussion of the pension system came to the attention of large sections of the population in 
2003 in the wake of the work of the “Rürup” Commission. The quintessence of the discussion is 
also reflected in the data: the average age of retirement for men in 2004 is estimated to be 1.5 
years later, while the average expected pension replacement rate fell by 5 percentage points. 
Table 6 shows the expected age of retirement and replacement rates according to age group. 
While the age of retirement differed only insignificantly between the group of under 30-year-
olds and the group of 50-59-year-olds in the year 2001 among re-interviewed male respondents, 
the difference of 3.6 years in the year 2004 reached the significant 5% mark. However, the an-
ticipated pension replacement rate for this group, which also increased, is unrealistic. 
Table 22 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the age of retirement and 
relative pension levels. Education variables are positively significant, which could mean one of 
two things. People with higher educational qualifications may really retire later, or they may 
simply be more aware of the normal age of retirement of the future. The dummy variables for the 
Random Route 2003 subsamples and TPI 2004 are also significant. On average, respondents for 
this subsample anticipated retiring between 0.6 and 1.2 years later. Particularly for the TPI 2004 
variable, this is clearly a result specific to this particular year, during which pension reform was 
a focal point of public discussion. The significant age effect 16 is positive with a maximum of 71 
years. This means that younger households expect to receive relatively lower value pensions than 
older households – again probably due to the current pension reform discussion.  
Table 6: Anticipated age of retirement and pension replacement age according to age 
  TPI 2001a) TPI 2004a)  2003 RR 
 Men Women Men Women  Men Women 
Age Retirement Rateb) Retirement Rate  Retirement Rate Retirement Rate  Retirement Rate Retirement Rate 
Under 30 63.8 58.2% 63.4 54.0% 66.0 65.0% 62.0   63.6 50.9% 63.7 48.0%
30-39 63.7 59.9% 61.2 58.7% 65.2 53.3% 63.2 53.1%  64.0 57.6% 62.8 52.2%
40-49 62.6 64.9% 61.4 62.3% 64.0 56.5% 62.8 43.9%  62.9 59.2% 62.8 59.5%
50-59 62.1 63.6% 60.9 57.1% 63.4 64.0% 62.3 53.9%  62.8 62.2% 62.8 61.2%
60 and 
older 63.0 67.0% 62.5 59.0% 64.0 52.6% 63.9   63.8 60.6% 63.2 60.7%
Note: Weighted according to age and income in SAVE; figures exclude freelance professionals and the self-
employed. 
a) Panel comparison: Only households / respondents interviewed in both waves 
b) Pension replacement rate in relation to last income received prior to retirement 
 
 
                                                 
16 Age and quadratic age are jointly significant. 
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3. Household assets 
This section describes the asset situation of households based on the data provided by both 
SAVE subsamples TPI 2004 and Random Route 2003. We begin by presenting the current asset 
situation and go on to describe how the asset situation can be calculated at the age of retirement. 
 
3.1 Descriptives for SAVE IV and SAVE RR 2003 
Table 7 shows the value of households’ financial, real estate (owner-occupied and other real es-
tate) and total assets. While the mean values are very close to each other, the underlying distribu-
tion of assets differs in both subsamples. The median for total assets in TPI 2004, for example, is 
thirteen times the value of RR 2003. This is partly to do with the fact that 15% of households in 
TPI 2004 and 32% of households in RR 2003 have 0 or negative assets. 
A median of 0, for example, for real estate means that at least half of all households do not own 
any residential property at all. 
Table 7: Financial, real estate, and total assets 
  Financial assets Real estate assets Total assets 
  TPI 2004 RR 2003  TPI 2004 RR 2003  TPI 2004 RR 2003 
Mean 
value 23805.1 21062.73 151863.3 130270 166507.2 140014.5 
Median 4000 2300 100000 0 119000 9000 
Std. error 2791.49 2791.49 8955.31 5930.80 12768.12 14105.88 
Number 306 1266  469 1901  234 1109 
Note: Weighted according to age and income. 
 
Table 8 and Table 9 show which asset categories go to make up total assets and demonstrate that 
owner-occupied property makes up by far the largest element of people’s assets. This is certainly 
noteworthy in the light of people’s asset position upon entering retirement. Residential property 
is seldom divisible. In other words, it is not possible to sell off a house or flat bit by bit17. Nor is 
post-retirement communal living or flat-sharing likely to be to everyone’s taste. It is of course 
possible to sell one’s property and to reshuffle one’s assets by converting real estate into finan-
cial wealth. However, this also entails a substantial increase in the household’s consumption ex-
penditure in the form of rental payments for alternative rented property. Bearing in mind the 
                                                 
17 Excluding the renting out of accessory apartments, for example. 
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value attached to home ownership in Germany, this latter option obviously cannot be in the in-
terests of owner-occupiers. 
Table 8: Relative value of assets: a) SAVE TPI 2004 
  
Owner-
occupied 
property 
Other real 
estate 
Business 
assets 
Financial 
assets Loans Other assets 
Absolute values      
Mean value 60.4% 4.9% 0.2% 33.3% 40.7% 1.3% 
Median 79.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Std. error 2.8% 1.0% 0.1% 2.8% 17.8% 17.8% 
Number 211 211 211 211 211 211 
Conditional values for possession of asset category    
Mean value 81.7% 35.0% 8.5% 39.1% 99.9% 10.9% 
Median 93.5% 30.5% 4.6% 17.6% 20.0% 4.7% 
Std. error 1.9% 3.6% 3.1% 3.0% 38.2% 3.8% 
Number 150 39 6 187 109 32 
Note: Weighted according to age and income. 
a) Value of specified assets divided by the value of gross total assets (total assets – loans). 
 
Table 9: Relative value of assets: a) SAVE RR 2003 
  
Owner-
occupied prop-
erty 
Other real 
estate 
Business 
assets 
Financial 
assets Loans Other assets 
Absolute values      
Mean value 43.2% 3.6% 1.6% 50.1% 38.7% 1.5% 
Median 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Std. error 1.6% 0.5% 0.3% 1.6% 12.5% 0.3% 
Number 787 787 787 787 787 787 
Conditional values for possession of asset category    
Mean value 83.7% 35.5% 32.4% 56.9% 165.7% 16.8% 
Median 91.3% 30.0% 25.7% 77.1% 25.6% 7.5% 
Std. error 1.0% 2.6% 4.6% 1.7% 51.4% 2.9% 
Number 404 79 40 694 192 73 
Note: Weighted according to age and income. 
a) Value of specified assets divided by the value of gross total assets (total assets – loans). 
 
 
3.2 Assets on retirement 
Assets on retirement will differ from current assets owing to the influence of two factors. On the 
one hand, assets will bear interest at a nominal rate i. On the other, account must be taken of 
general inflation. The purchasing power of 1 euro will not be the same in ten years’ time as it is 
 16
today. In this respect, the required rate of return r equals the difference between the nominal rate 
of interest i and the rate of price increase p. We assume that all assets are subject to a constant 
effective interest rate and base our calculations on the required rate of return of 2.8% per annum 
used by the Rürup Commission. 
The interest period is the difference between the expected age of retirement and the present age 
of the head of household. We assume that no asset consumption takes place prior to retirement. 
Compound interest effects therefore generate a substantial increase in assets during the period 
prior to retirement. At an effective rate of interest of 2.8%, for example, the value of assets dou-
bles over a period of 25 years. 
Current flows of savings in each period up to retirement are added to existing assets as described 
in the following. SAVE surveys total household savings for the previous year. These annual sav-
ings are then recalculated and spread evenly across the year as monthly savings figures. We also 
assume that these monthly savings remain at a constant level right up to retirement and that they 
also yield 2.8% p.a. interest. 
The entire asset position of the household on entering retirement is therefore determined by the 
assets with accrued interest added plus the monthly savings and interest on such savings. 
Appendix 3 summarises the relevant financial equations.  
 
4. Old-age income provision and claims on the public retirement 
insurance system 
This section describes households’ claims on pension benefits from the public retirement insur-
ance system before and after the reform proposals of the Rürup Commission adopted for 2005 
and which involve an incremental reduction, as a response to demographic trends, in relative 
pension levels. Section 4.2 calculates a household’s hypothetical annuities18 based on assets 
saved prior to entering retirement. In this framework we distinguish between total assets and fi-
nancial assets: real estate assets typically form the largest share of a household’s assets portfolio. 
It is quite a different matter liquidating real estate assets than typical financial assets. 
This section is structured as follows. 4.1 outlines the method used to calculate individual house-
hold pension entitlements. Section 4.2 explains how the critical variables used to calculate pen-
                                                 
18 The term annuity as used here differs from its usual actuarial definition in that there is no longevity risk if the 
household reaches precisely its anticipated life expectancy. Life annuities are typically based on mortality tables. 
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sion entitlements are determined and section 4.3 briefly elucidates the presentation format and 
presents the results of the SAVE data for household pension entitlements. 
 
4.1 Calculation method 
We calculate claims on the public retirement insurance system on the basis of individual data 
relative to the entitlement position of a benchmark pensioner (“Eckrentner”).19 
Two values are needed in order to calculate individual entitlements from the public retirement 
insurance system: the number of insurance years (calculated on the basis of the anticipated age of 
retirement and estimated age at which people’s working lives begin20), and average earned in-
come over an entire working life. 
The pension entitlement RA per household HH for the year 2004 is therefore as follows: 
 [ ]( ) AFRA
years
RA ER
BEV
HH
HH •••−= EKØ
EKØ
45
EEAREAE HHHH  (1) 
 where 
 [ ]HHREAE   =  anticipated age of retirement of the household HH 
 HHEEA  =  Age at which household begins its working life  HH 
 BEVHHEK ,Ø  =  Average earned income of household HH or of the population 
 ERRA  =  Benchmark pensioner’s net pension entitlement (€1,068.40 in 2002) 
 AF  = Adjustment factor used to calculate deductions or additional credits in the 
case of earlier or later retirement 
We draw on the standard age of retirement of 65, disregarding total and partial disability rules. 
The earliest possible age of retirement is currently age 63 and will be reduced by the 1999 Pen-
sion Reform Act in two-monthly steps to the age of 62 21 by 2010 to 2011. Monthly deduc-
                                                 
19 A benchmark pensioner has worked and paid pension contributions for 45 years – precisely in accordance with the 
average for all contributors – and has consequently had one earnings point per year credited to his or her pension 
account. Average income in 2002 was €28,949, or net monthly average earnings of €1,531.92. 45 earnings points 
currently entitle a benchmark pensioner to a gross monthly pension of €1,175.85 euros in the western Germany and 
€1033.65 in the new eastern states or, after deducting health and long term care insurance contributions of €89.77, a 
net monthly pension of €1,086.08. Refer to the publications of the German Federal Social Insurance Office for Sala-
ried Employees (BfA). 
20 People are assumed to begin their working lives at the following ages: age 16 for those with a lower or intermedi-
ate secondary school leaving certificate, aged 20 for those with the ‘Abitur’ upper secondary school leaving certifi-
cate, and age 25 for those with university or polytechnic degrees. If the head of household has been unemployed for 
a period longer than one month, an additional year of work is deducted. 
21 Which implies a pension benefit deduction of 10.8% 
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tions/credits amount to 0.3/0.5% per month or 3.6/6% per year. While there is no statutorily de-
fined upper age limit for retirement, the actuarially unfair credits do not, however, offer any in-
centive for people to postpone their retirement decisions.22 
Equation (1) describes the deductions or credits received by a household compared with a 
benchmark pensioner depending on relative income, relative number of insurance years and an-
ticipated age of retirement. 
We calculate the pension gap as follows.  
Gross pension levels prior to the Riester reform and the introduction of the sustainability factor, 
as well as the values after both reforms had taken full effect, were calculated using the MEA-
PENSIM model (for a description of the simulation model, refer to Wilke (2004)). Post-reform 
pension value is estimated at 86.6% of the pre-reform gross pension value where the 2004 Pen-
sion Reform Act provisions have taken full effect, which will be the case from the year 2030 
onwards. Calculating net pension levels is somewhat more complicated. The new pension taxa-
tion rules make it very difficult to make any general assumptions in this respect. For the sake of 
simplicity we therefore assume that the percentage decrease in gross pension levels is reflected 
analogously in net pension levels. Based on these assumptions the reduction factor, RF, will 
therefore be specified in the following way: 
RF = f(cohort, pension entry age, life expectancy) (2) 
See Table 10 clarifying examples of (2). 
Table 10: Pension levels after the year 2003 relative to pension levels before the pension re-
forms 2001 and 2004 
  Age 
Life expec-
tancy 40 45 50 55 60 
70 85.7% 87.7% 89.7% 91.6% 93.2% 
75 85.0% 86.9% 88.7% 90.6% 92.4% 
80 84.5% 86.3% 87.8% 89.7% 91.5% 
85 84.3% 85.7% 87.1% 88.8% 90.6% 
Note: Assumed retirement age of 65 years. Early retirement leads to slightly higher values since the relative 
pension level declines with time, and with earlier retirement one would get the higher values. Ex.: At 
retirement with 61 years of a today 40-year-old with life expectancy of 70 years, shown values would be 
higher by 0.5%, for a 60-year-old by about 1%. These values are only relative numbers and are contrasted by 
the pension reduction factor for early retirement. Source: MEA-PENSIM. 
 
The gap in provision, DL, is thus calculated as follows: 
                                                 
22 Börsch-Supan et al. (2004) calculated the incentive-neutral deductions and credits at around 7% p.a. Refer also to 
Börsch-Supan (2004) for a definition of incentive-neutral deductions. 
 19
PGHH = RAHH x RF = RAHH • (1 - RF) (3) 
where PGHH indicates the pension gap of household HH due to the pension reforms. 
(3) suggests that the pension gap is equally great in percentage terms for all households, 
as was intended by the Commission on the long-term financial viability of the German social 
security system ("Rürup Commission"). 
 
4.2 Specification of individual variables 
The anticipated age of retirement of a household HH, [ ]HHREAE , is derived from the data record 
“What are your expectations? – At what age do you expect to retire or receive an old-age pen-
sion?” In this context we draw on the earliest possible retirement age under future legislation – 
age 62, with a pension deduction of 10.8%. As there is no statutorily stipulated upper age limit, 
higher figures are not corrected. The deductions and credits referred to in section 4.1 are taken 
into account to determine the deduction factor AF. 
The age at which people started their working life HHEEA  is not surveyed in the SAVE study. 
We therefore assume the following three labour market entry ages, in relation to educational at-
tainment: age 16 for those with a lower or intermediate secondary school leaving certificate, age 
20 for those with the ‘Abitur’ upper secondary school leaving certificate and 25 for those with a 
university or polytechnic degree. 
The length of a person’s working life, and thus the number of years during which contributions 
are paid, the difference between [ ]HHREAE  and HHEEA , is reduced by one year if the employ-
ment history of the head of household includes a period of unemployment of longer than six 
months.23 
The household’s average earned income, HHEKØ , is determined by estimating the age profile of 
the income received according to the estimate of permanent household income. The household’s 
earned income on retirement is thus determined and compared with the average value over the 
                                                 
23 This ultimately simplifies the actual statutory rules. In fact, unemployed people in receipt of benefits from the la-
bour office are also covered by the pension insurance scheme. Contributions to the scheme are paid by the labour 
office. The relevant contributions for those in receipt of unemployment benefit are levied on the basis of 80% of 
their last earned income. The contributions for unemployment assistance claimants are only levied on the basis of 
the assistance amount. People drawing old-age pensions or receiving total disability benefits are no longer entitled to 
benefits from the labour office, even if their entitlement period has not yet expired. The situation is quite different 
for those in receipt of partial disability benefits. In this case the labour office continues to pay unemployment benefit 
in addition to disability benefits, but only up to the additional earnings limit. 
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working life. The estimates reveal that earned income is 5% higher than average income at the 
age of retirement (cf. Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Estimated earnings curve over the entire working life 
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Notes: Normalized values: Indx is 1 at age 20. The average figure is 12.3% below that at age 65 (normal age of 
retirement). 
Source: All SAVE data without retired, self-employed freelancers. 
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Figure 3: Comparison with results from Fitzenberger et al. (2001) 
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Notes: Normalized values: Index is 1 at age 20. Wage projections except SAVE refer to results from Fitzenberger et 
al. (2001). 
 
The retirement ages elicited in the survey were in many cases considerably lower than the future 
earliest state pension age of 62. These values were therefore replaced by the minimum pension 
age. 
Deductions are frozen at 10.8% for these cases. If no pension entry age was given by respon-
dents, an entry age of 61 was assumed.24 
Households are typically subject to larger uncertainties and exogenous fluctuations at the 
beginning of their working lives than they are later on.26 All the results in Sections 4 and 5 
therefore relate to households in the age 40 or older age group and are not yet retired. 
 
4.3 Results 
The actual meaning of the figures and how they should be interpreted are now briefly discussed 
before the results themselves are presented. 
                                                 
24 If the respondent is already older than 61 and not yet retired: pensions entry age = age + 1 
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Projected future pension benefits can basically be regarded as nominal, real or economic status-
preserving euro amounts. These three different presentation options differ by the way in which 
future inflation or, additionally, wage trends are accounted for.25 It is also possible to present 
possible (future) pension benefits in relation to (future) income. While this enables explicit ad-
justments for inflation to be avoided, the disadvantage is that it is necessary to know what per-
centage rates mean, which is unfortunately not necessarily the case for many households. 
The status-preserving variables for pension data are consequently values which specify how 
much the household would receive if it were to enter retirement today, taking account of all other 
outstanding future contributions. This does away with the need for any further mental acrobatics 
for general or wage inflation adjustments and the variables can therefore be compared directly 
with today’s income. 
Table 11: Pension levels prior to and after the impact of the 2004 pension reform 
 Current values Post Rürup  Pension gap 
  
Pension 
level 
Relative to 
pred. last net 
income  Pension level 
Relative to 
pred. last net 
incom   In today's Euros 
Mean 
value 1393.9 58.6% 1247.6 52.2%  156 
Median 1352.8 57.7% 1211.5 51.1%  144.4 
Std. error 17.1 0.3% 15.2 0.3%  2.5 
Number 897 897  875 875   875 
Note: Weighted values.  
Source: SAVE RR 2003 and TPI 2004. Self-employed and freelancers are excluded. 
 
Table 11 shows that the reform measures entail a 13% reduction in net pension levels in current 
euro amounts – i.e. around 260 € or one fifth of current pension levels. 
 
                                                 
25 Cf. Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Reil-Held (2004), who discuss the presentation options in considerable detail and 
emphasise the importance of how each of them are used. The way these are presented can have a huge influence on 
the way a person’s individual pension future is perceived as is the case, for example, with pension notifications sent 
by the BfA. The latter present a picture of future nominal pension entitlements and include a statement that no ad-
justments have been made for inflation. The values as stated are therefore higher than many people expect, which 
can in turn result in misguided economic behaviour. 
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5. Private pension provision: how the pension gap can be closed 
This section compares the post-retirement income sourced from annuitized assets (cf. section 3) 
with claims on the public retirement insurance system, and considers in particular whether pri-
vate asset positions can compensate for the pension gap.  
Section 5.1 calculates a household’s hypothetical annuities 26 based on assets saved prior to en-
tering retirement. In this framework we distinguish between total and financial assets: real estate 
assets typically form the largest share of a household’s assets portfolio. It is quite a different mat-
ter liquidating real estate assets than typical financial assets, however. Section 5.2 compares pri-
vate savings accumulated by the age of retirement with the pension gap and examines to what 
extent households are in a position to close this gap. 
Section 4.3 argues that status-preserving variables offer an appropriate means of presenting fu-
ture income and assets positions. Similarly we make adjustments to the development of assets in 
order to ensure that personal assets are not overestimated in comparison with pension develop-
ments. Future assets are therefore adjusted for wage growth g by dividing them by 
( ) HH#rtrittsalteRentenieing+1  or using the approximative required rate of return cr = r – g. 
Section 5.2 compares private savings accumulated by the age of retirement with the pension 
gap and examines to what extent households are in a position to close this gap. The starting 
point in the analysis is the subjective life expectancy. But since it can be presumed thathouse-
holds systematically underestimate their life expectancy, results from alternative values are 
also shown, including the official life tables. 
After the sensitivity analysis for life expectancy values, Section 5.3 shows the results from 
Section 5.2 in dependence of the parameters r, the real interest rate, and g, the real wage 
growth rate. 
Section 5.4 shows the ability to fill the pension gap in dependence of three household charac-
teristics: age, income, and schooling. 
 
                                                 
26 The term annuity as used here refers to individual life expectancy and is not based on the life expectancy calcu-
lated by insurance companies using individualised mortality tables. In this respect the term differs from its usual ac-
tuarial definition in that there is no longevity risk if the household reaches precisely its anticipated life expectancy. 
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5.1 Provision for old age and personal assets 
In addition to pension benefits provided by the public retirement insurance system, all house-
holds could hypothetically receive annuities from their saved personal assets. In this case we 
make the following assumptions. The household does not include any inheritances in its financial 
planning; these only arise if members of the household die earlier than expected and therefore do 
not consume their entire savings. The relevant points in time for calculating annuities are the an-
ticipated date of retirement (in order to project savings and assets based on the effective rate of 
interest r = 2.8% p.a.) and life expectancy (the point in time up until which annuity payments 
will be made). The payout period is thus the difference between these two points in time.  
In SAVE, Gross financial wealth27 is constructed by eight different wealth categories. For consis-
tency reasons, only full information observations are used. This means that for a household indi-
cating the ownership of a wealth category but refuses the answer for the corresponding wealth 
value for any of these categories, financial cannot be constructed. This procedure entails a large 
data loss. To mitigate this data loss, financial wealth is imputed in the following way. In a semi-
logarithmic specification, relative financial wealth (financial wealth / net income) was regressed 
on a polynomial on net income and age; socio-demographics; and dummy variables indicating 
the ownership for any of the six28 wealth categories. Solving the predicted values for financial 
wealth (exponent of ln(financial wealth/ net income) times net income) raises the number of ob-
servations by 50%. The relevant sample was the later used (age 40 to 65, no retired HH, no self-
employed and freelancers). The regression results are shown in the Appendix. Imputed values 
are only used for households for which computing wealth was not possible. Households indicat-
ing no possession for every financial wealth group have a total financial wealth, accordingly. 
 
Table 12: Monthly life annuities from predicted savings, future financial and housing wealth, 
based on subjective life expectancy 
 Savings Financial wealtha Housing wealth Conditional housing wealth 
Mean 348.0 € 299.6 € 1,548.7 € 2,960.4 €
Median 108.4 € 99.6 € 384.9 € 1,834.5 € 
Std. error 26.7 € 39.8 € 176.6 € 316.0 € 
Obs. 662 673 768 417 
a Net financial wealth (total financial wealth reduced by consumption, family and other short-run credits) Note: 
Weighted values. 
Source:  SAVE RR 2003 and TPI 2004.  Only households with head being between 40-65.  Self-employed and 
freelancers excluded. 
 
                                                 
27 financial wealth without credit 
28 The three forms of private old-age provisions of any form were aggregated. 
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The means of monthly life annuities are relatively high. The future values of today's financial net 
wealth reaches a monthly life annuity of 300 €. Assuming that today's savings will be continued 
in the future and annuitized at the pension entry age, an additional second monthly life annuity of 
348 € will be received. Finally, if it would be liquidated, housing wealth would provide a third 
annuity of 1548 €. 
Means of wealth values are misleading, since the wealth distributions typically are skewed to the 
right. This can be read by the median values which are significantly lower than the means; the 
median values are about 1/3 for savings and financial wealth. Additionally, some households do 
not hold financial assets or do not even save, which leads to an annuity of 0. E.g., the condi-
tional29 annuity for housing wealth provides an annuity of 2960 € which is about twice as high as 
the unconditional value. 
Additionally, the annuities presented in Table 12 are calculated using subjective life expectan-
cies. These are, as shown in Section 2, significantly lower projections from current life tables. 
Table 13 shows the same values as in Table 12, but assumes a more realistic life expectancy. 
Hence, monthly private pensions from accrued savings, financial and housing wealth drop by 
about 20%. 
Table 13: Monthly life annuities from predicted savings, future financial and housing wealth, 
based on subjective life expectancy plus 3 years 
 Savings Financial wealtha Housing wealth Conditional housing wealth 
Mean 311.0 € 248.8 € 1,222.6 € 2,324.2 €
Median 94.8 € 84.6 € 378.8 € 1,580.4 € 
Std. error 31.3 € 33.6 € 85.4 € 139.1 € 
Obs. 672 683 781 427 
a Net financial wealth (total financial wealth reduced by consumption, family and other short-run credits) Note: 
Weighted values. 
Source:  SAVE RR 2003 and TPI 2004.  Only households with head being between 40-65.  Self-employed and 
freelancers excluded. 
 
5.2 Values from monthly private pensions in relation to the pension 
gap 
As the next step, it will be shown how the private pension wealth from Table 12 and Table 13 
compare to the pension gap shown in Table 11. 
                                                 
29 Conditional on home ownership 
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Table 14 summarizes the results as percentaged filling of the pension gap. It also compares three 
different measures of financial wealth plus savings. 
The first one is net financial wealth (computed as the sum of eight different financial wealth 
categories minus short-run consumption, family and other credits) and net savings (computed as 
gross savings30 plus credit repayments plus contributions to life insurances), 'Riester' plans and 
occupational pension plans, assuming that households do not think of these categories when try-
ing to recall total last year's savings. Evidence for this hypothesis is provided in Essig (2005). 
The second one is gross financial wealth (all financial wealth categories ignoring short-run cred-
its) and net savings. The third is net financial wealth and gross savings (without credit repay-
ments and imputed contributions). The numbers are quite similar and do not change the qualita-
tive statements. This becomes clear when looking at the short-run credit volume which is rather 
low with a mean of 1850 € and a median of 0 (weighted values). The difference between the 
gross and net medians of monthly savings measure is about 15 €. In the following, the first set 
will be used for the rest of the analysis (net savings, net financial wealth). 
Numbers higher than 100% means that the private pensions which a household can retrieve from 
private wealth, suffice to fill the pension gap, numbers below 100% indicate that the pension gap 
cannot be covered. It shall be emphasized again at this point that the current savings behavior is 
projected, and therefore it is not accounted for possible behavioral changes possibly induced by 
the pension reforms 2001 and 2004. The research interest is: do household save enough today to 
fill the future gap? 
Table 14: Households' ability to fill the pension gap in dependence of the life expectancy 
  own LE own LE + 3 
own LE 
+ 5 
own LE + 
10 LE from life tables 
Net financial wealth including consumption credits and accrued savings, including contributions to 
Riester plans, life insurances and credit repayments 
Mean 362.3% 290.1% 262.0% 216.9% 305.0% 
Median 198.8% 157.2% 141.6% 117.6% 161.0% 
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.4% 14.1% 19.1% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provision 32.4% 35.8% 37.3% 43.7% 35.1% 
Financial wealth without credits and accrued savings, including contributions to Riester plans, life 
insurances and credit repayments 
Mean 379.1% 303.4% 273.6% 226.1% 316.8% 
Median 204.2% 168.9% 147.0% 121.0% 168.3% 
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.3% 14.0% 18.9% 
                                                 
30 as the values given to the one-shot savings question 
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Obs. 593 597 597 597 619 
Gap in provision 30.5% 34.0% 35.9% 42.0% 33.4% 
Net financial wealth and accrued gross savings, including consumption credits and accrued gross 
savings 
Mean 328.2% 262.0% 237.1% 196.7% 275.7% 
Median 174.5% 146.4% 131.9% 107.5% 144.1% 
Std. error 23.3% 17.8% 15.9% 12.9% 17.0% 
Obs. 609 614 614 614 638 
Gap in provision 35.5% 38.8% 40.6% 45.6% 37.8% 
Note: Weighted values. Share of households with zero or negative savings and financial wealth: 1 6%. 
The same arguments pointed out for Table 12 and Table 13 also apply for Table 14: mean values 
are quite high and definitely high enough to fill the gap. Median values, in contrast, come close 
to one when assuming a 10 year longer life expectancy, and about one third of the households in 
the sample will not be able to fill the gap. This percentage grows to 44% assuming a 10 year 
higher life expectancy. The values' dependence on life expectancy is has a simple reason. Indi-
vidual longevity risk is not covered by personal assets where this risk is not borne by other in-
sured persons as is the case, for example, in the public retirement insurance system. The last col-
umn of the table shows the filling of the gap assuming values of current life tables; results com-
pare about to underestimating the subjective life expectancy by three years. But the current life 
tables ignore all medical progress in the future and of the past31 . The Rürup-commission, for ex-
ample, anticipates an increase in life expectancy of 2.5 years over the next 30 years. This fore-
cast is about 2/3 lower than the estimates of Oeppen and Vaupel (2002). If the more optimistic of 
these scenarios - a long-term increase in life expectancy of 0.25 years per year - proves to be cor-
rect, the public pension insurance system will be confronted by further financing problems which 
will articulate themselves once again in the form of rising contribution rates and lower pension 
benefits. The non-coverage of the gap thus affects about 36 to 40% of all households, while the 
median value is able to fill the gap by more than 100%. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of the ability to fill the pension gap 
                                                 
31 affecting the survivors of each cohort in the life tables 
 28
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
0 
an
d 
be
lo
w
0-
10
%
10
-2
0%
20
-3
0%
30
-4
0%
40
-5
0%
50
-6
0%
60
-7
0%
70
-8
0%
80
-9
0%
90
-1
00
%
10
0-
12
0%
12
0-
15
0%
15
0-
20
0%
20
0-
30
0%
30
0-
50
0%
50
0-
10
00
%
10
 to
 1
5
15
 to
 2
0
>=
 2
0
subjective
LE
subjective
LE + 3
years
LE from life
tables
 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
The skewness of the distribution of savings and wealth is thus also reflected in Figure 4 which 
shows the distribution of the ratios of monthly life annuities to the pension gap. The distribution 
also shows that obviously, there are two major groups of households: the ones not being able at 
all to fill the gap at 0% and below, and the other ones who can easily absorb the financial task 
with 200-1000% of the gap. 
 
5.3 Robustness of the results 
This section checks the effects of different interest and growth rate scenarios on the results found 
so far. The shown numbers base on a scenario with real interest rate of 2.8% p.a., which corre-
sponds to a nominal interest rate of 4.3% p.a. assuming an inflation rate of 1.5% which is aspired 
by the European Central Bank. The current interest rate is below the assumed real interest rate, 
but the average rate since the 1970s is higher than this value. The same is true for the current 
growth rate; its average value since the 1970s is also higher than the assumed wage growth rate 
of 1.5%. Current reforms aim to strengthen productivity and regain higher growth rates; on the 
other hand, the demographic change might weaken economic growth and reduce the probability 
to reach a long-run growth rate of 1.5% or more. 
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The procedure here is thus as follows. First, the growth rate is assumed being constant, while the 
interest rate will be varied (r = 2,0% / 2,8% / 3,5%, cf. Table 15), while in the second compari-
son, interest rates will be held constant and growth rates are varied (g = 1,0% / 1,5% / 2,0%, cf. 
Table 16). In a third step, a pessimistic scenario is contrasted by an optimistic one (r=2,0% and 
g=1,0% versus r=3,5% and g=2,0%, cf. Table 17). 
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Table 15: Filling the pension gap in dependence of the capital market return 
Low returns, r = 2.0% 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  
own 
LE 
own LE + 
3 
own LE + 
5 
own LE + 
10 
LE from life ta-
bles 
Mean 323.6% 256.1% 229.7% 186.9% 270.0% 
Median 174.1% 142.1% 126.5% 100.4% 139.2% 
Std. error 23.4% 17.5% 15.4% 12.2% 16.8% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provi-
sion 35.1% 38.7% 41.6% 47.5% 38.7% 
      
Medium returns, r = 2.8% 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  
own 
LE 
own LE + 
3 
own LE + 
5 
own LE + 
10 
LE from life ta-
bles 
Mean 362.3% 290.1% 262.0% 216.9% 305.0% 
Median 198.8% 157.2% 141.6% 117.6% 161.0% 
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.4% 14.1% 19.1% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provi-
sion 32.4% 35.8% 37.3% 43.7% 35.1% 
      
High returns, r = 3.5% 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  
own 
LE 
own LE + 
3 
own LE + 
5 
own LE + 
10 
LE from life ta-
bles 
Mean 400.2% 323.5% 294.0% 246.9% 339.4% 
Median 216.8% 175.6% 158.1% 132.4% 179.4% 
Std. error 28.0% 21.7% 19.4% 16.0% 21.4% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provi-
sion 31.1% 32.8% 34.2% 39.2% 33.2% 
Note: Weighted values. Wage growth rate g = 1.5%. 
 
A higher interest rate clearly raises the level of coverage of the pension gap, while lower interest 
rates makes this task more difficult. The effects are also not strong enough to change the number 
of households not being able to fill the gap in a large scope; the ratio remains by about 1/3. 
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Table 16: Filling the pension gap in dependence of the wage growth rate 
Weak wage growth rate g = 1.0% 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  own LE own LE + 3 
own LE 
+ 5 own LE + 10 
LE from life ta-
bles 
Mean 379.8% 303.8% 274.4% 227.2% 319.9% 
Median 207.0% 165.3% 147.9% 122.2% 169.0% 
Std. error 26.8% 20.5% 18.2% 14.8% 20.2% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provision 31.3% 34.0% 36.4% 42.1% 33.7% 
      
Medium wage growth rate g = 1.5% 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  own LE own LE + 3 
own LE 
+ 5 own LE + 10 
LE from life ta-
bles 
Mean 362.3% 290.1% 262.0% 216.9% 305.0% 
Median 198.8% 157.2% 141.6% 117.6% 161.0% 
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.4% 14.1% 19.1% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provision 32.4% 35.8% 37.3% 43.7% 35.1% 
      
Strong wage growth rate g = 2.0% 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  own LE own LE + 3 
own LE 
+ 5 own LE + 10 
LE from life ta-
bles 
Mean 345.8% 277.1% 250.4% 207.3% 291.0% 
Median 186.2% 152.1% 137.8% 111.4% 150.1% 
Std. error 24.6% 18.7% 16.6% 13.4% 18.1% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provision 33.7% 36.8% 39.6% 45.1% 36.4% 
Note: Weighted values. Capital market return  r = 2.8%. 
 
A stronger wage growth rate affects the relative position of retirees. Since economic status-
preserving values are compared here, the relative value of savings is negatively affected by a 
higher wage growth rate. This is why a higher growth rate would lower the share of coverage of 
the pension gap. 
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Table 17: Filling the pension gap in dependence of the wage growth rate 
Optimistic scenario (g = 2.0%, r = 3.5%) 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  
own 
LE 
own LE + 
3 
own LE + 
5 
own LE + 
10 LE from life tables 
Mean 381.6% 308.8% 280.7% 235.7% 323.4% 
Median 210.7% 166.8% 151.4% 126.4% 169.5% 
Std. error 26.7% 20.7% 18.5% 15.2% 20.3% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provi-
sion 31.5% 33.7% 35.6% 41.6% 34.1% 
      
Pessimistic scenario (g = 1.0%, r = 2.0%) 
  Net financial wealth and accrued savings 
  
own 
LE 
own LE + 
3 
own LE + 
5 
own LE + 
10 LE from life tables 
Mean 338.8% 267.9% 240.2% 195.5% 282.9% 
Median 184.7% 146.0% 130.4% 106.4% 148.0% 
Std. error 24.3% 18.2% 16.1% 12.7% 17.7% 
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599 
Gap in provi-
sion 34.1% 37.8% 40.8% 45.9% 37.7% 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
The difference between the optimistic and the pessimistic scenario are, given the results from 
Table 15 andTable 16, relatively small. Scenarios for interest and wage growth rate thus do not 
change the results qualitatively. 
 
5.4 Household types and the ability to fill the pension gap 
This part examines household types by three characteristics, schooling, age and income, and 
checks whether differences in any of these three variables influences the household's ability to 
fill the pension gap. The procedure is to divide households for each of these three variables into 
three groups. For age and income, terciles are built to uniformly distribute households. 
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Table 18: Filling the pension gap in dependence of age 
 Age 
  40 to 45 46 to 52 53 bis 65 
Mean 349.65% 360.63% 375.25% 
Median 197.86% 220.68% 181.54% 
Std. error 37.83% 37.93% 54.58% 
Obs. 192 192 191 
Gap in provision 32.29% 31.77% 32.98% 
Relation of monthly pensions 86.51% 89.12% 91.50% 
Pension values before `Riester'  
(Median) 1,480.47 € 1,342.89 € 1,191.72 € 
Pension gap (Median) 196.19 € 145.91 € 102.32 € 
Monthly life annuities (Median) 376.79 € 335.71 € 168.13 € 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
The share of households being able to fill the gap is rather constant over age classes. On a first 
glance, this is surprising since older households are not as hard affected by the pension reform as 
younger households (cf. Table 11). But younger households have a larger amount of financial 
wealth which will accrue to the pension entry age from which they will receive higher monthly 
life annuities. 
Table 19: Filling the pension gap in dependence of income 
 Income 
  up to 1800€ 
 1800 up to 
2750 € 
more than 
2750 € 
Mean 193.08% 356.07% 621.43% 
Median 71.65% 233.66% 395.34% 
Std. error 22.92% 38.85% 64.51% 
Obs. 217 163 194 
Gap in provision 53.00% 28.83% 12.37% 
Relation of monthly pensions 90.06% 88.53% 88.55% 
Pension values before `Riester'  
(Median) 977.56 € 1,479.84 € 1,859.53 € 
Pension gap (Median) 94.32 € 169.36 € 201.65 € 
Monthly life annuities (Median) 71.37 € 358.85 € 806.33 € 
Note: Weighted values. 
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When looking at pension gaps and income classes, one can find that the calculated pension re-
duction factors32 are distributed relatively evenly over income classes. This is due to the age dis-
tribution which is relatively even between income classes. Differences arise concerning the abil-
ity to fill the pension gap since households in the upper third of the income distribution are better 
prepared due to a larger financial provision relative to their income. This is important to mention 
since, of course, the pension gap of these households is also higher, according to their income 
and their pension entitlements. 
Table 20: Filling the pension gap in dependence of schooling levels 
 Schooling 
  
Hauptschule/Mittlere 
Reife 
Abitur/ 
Fachhochschulabschl. 
FH/ 
Studiumsabschluss
Mean 297.84% 361.30% 624.98% 
Median 151.87% 220.68% 375.91% 
Std. error 22.87% 57.97% 97.20% 
Obs. 413 50 112 
Gap in provision 38.74% 30.00% 9.82% 
Relation of monthly pensions 89.32% 88.36% 88.76% 
Pension values before `Riester'  
(Median) 1,249.09 € 1,600.82 € 1,632.66 € 
Pension gap (Median) 132.04 € 189.17 € 180.53 € 
Monthly life annuities (Median) 187.78 € 411.19 € 620.34 € 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
Similar to income classes, the separation for schooling classes reveals an even distribution for 
the pension reduction factor, as age is evenly distributed between the schooling classes. But con-
cerning the ability to fill the pension gap, Table 20 shows large differences. The share of house-
holds not being able to fill the gap is much smaller for the group with a college degree. One 
might presume that this is due to a higher associated income, but that is not the case as can be at 
the pension entitlements. They are much the same for the second and the third group, but their 
financial wealth and savings is not. The share of households with zero savings is much smaller in 
the group with the highest schooling. This can have two explanations. The first one is that 
households with a college degree are more disciplined and self-controlled concerning their fi-
nancial planning and foresight. The other one is that that their response behavior might differ 
from households with a lower schooling, which might more likely to tend to escape the effort to 
answer to 'annoying' questions for savings and wealth. 
                                                 
32 which take account of the affect of the pension reforms 
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes how many households are already prepared to fill the upcoming pension 
gap, assuming no changes of of financial behavior. Considering accrued33 financial wealth and 
monthly savings as the basis for calculating monthly life annuities, it can be shown that about 1/3 
of all households in the sample will not be able to fill the pension gap they will have to face, 
even if they use all their financial wealth and savings. Even the median household would nearly 
loose all degree of freedoms for other financial allocation choices. If a household is forced to 
consume all the financial wealth to reach to the pension level known today, it practically elimi-
nates the possibilities reaching a higher pension level which is closer to the income flows before 
retirement. 
The values of subjective life expectancy, which is a crucial variable in this analysis, are shown to 
be assumed independent of age which is counterfactual. Therefore, the subjective life expectancy 
is compared to the influence of more realistic values. This affects additional 3 to 10% of the 
households in the sample which, assuming the realistic values, will not be able to fill the pension 
gap. 
The lessons to be learned are that the long-term savings rate will need to increase if we are to 
master the challenges posed by the demographic trends which, in the final analysis, are the rea-
son for the introduction of the sustainability factor. Policymakers would be well advised to draw 
attention to these developments. 
Despite low uptake and acceptance, the introduction of the Riester pension has at the very least 
increased peoples' awareness of the problems the future holds. Households now reflect consid-
erably more on the provision they are making for their old age than was the case prior to the re-
form. The task must be to reinforce this trend. 
                                                 
33 at the time of the households' pension entry age 
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Appendix 1: Description of SAVE data records 
In Germany there is currently no set of data available that records detailed savings data in con-
junction with sociological and psychological characteristics. The socio-economic panel (SOEP) 
only records rough indicators such as "Did you spend all of your income last year or was there 
anything left over?" or "Do you have a savings book?", etc. but does not cover the quantitative 
composition of or any changes in assets. The position is similar for the "debit and credit" survey 
which contains very detailed data on the composition of various forms of investment but does 
not quantify these in greater detail. 
The income and consumption survey (EVS) conducted every five years by the Federal Statistical 
Office, with its detailed information on the amount and composition of income, expenditure and 
wealth, is the main source of data on the savings behavior of households in Germany. The 1993 
EVS also contains the most important socio-demographic characteristics for all persons living in 
the household; SOEP surveys in contrast only contain information on the reference person. In the 
light of the squeeze on public funds, the 1998 EVS survey has again been slimmed down drasti-
cally and in some areas it bears very little resemblance to earlier surveys. It still covers a very 
large number of households but several variables that are important for savings behavior are now 
missing, however, and more extensive sociological or psychological factors are completely ab-
sent in the income and consumption surveys, because these very expensive surveys are primarily 
intended for the work of the Federal Statistical Office. 
Weaknesses of existing data material can only be rectified by new surveys. The previous section 
has shown that to understand savings behavior it is important to record variables which can also 
describe psychologically determined behavioral phenomena. Taking as a basis the examples of 
the Dutch CentER Panels, the US Health and Retirement Surveys, and the Bank of Italy’s Survey 
on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) we have cooperated with the Mannheim Center for 
Surveys, Methods and Analyses (ZUMA), Infratest-Burke (Munich), Psychonomics (Cologne) to 
produce a questionnaire consisting of six sections. It is printed in the Appendix. The question-
naire has been designed in such a way that the interview should not exceed 45 minutes. Table 21 
provides an overview of the SAVE questionnaire. 
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Table 21: Structure of the SAVE questionnaire 
Part 1: Introduction, identifying the household respondent 
Part 2: Basic socio-economic household data 
Part 3: Qualitative questions concerning saving behaviour, income and wealth 
Part 4: Budget balance: quantitative questions on income and wealth 
Part 5: Psychological and social determinants of savings behaviour 
Part 6: Conclusion: interview situation 
 
The brief first section explains the purpose of the questionnaire and describes the precautions 
that have been taken in respect of data protection. We feel this introduction is appropriate be-
cause the survey particularly deals with the personal affairs of those surveyed. The interviewer 
then asks to speak to a member of the household who knows about their income and assets. If 
this person is not at home, the interviewer must make a return visit. 
Part 2 lasts about 15 minutes and is the standard initial interview in which questions are asked 
about the composition and socio-economic structure of the household, including age, education 
and participation in the labor force of the person surveyed and his or her partner.  
The interviewer deals with the key issues in Part 3 of the questionnaire. This part contains quali-
tative and simple quantitative questions on saving behavior and how households deal with in-
come and assets, such as the type of investment selected for one-off injections of cash, the im-
portance of a series of savings motives, whether there is actually anything left over to save, how 
regularly savings are made, etc. Questions are also asked about decision processes and possible 
rules of thumb, past patterns of behavior as well as their parents and attitude to money. 
Part 4 is the critical part of the questionnaire because this is where a complete "financial review" 
is made of the household. A detailed survey is made of income according to the types of income, 
changes in income, the level of assets according to the various kinds of wealth and changes in 
the types of wealth over the last year. Apart from financial assets, the questions also cover pri-
vate and company pensions, ownership of property and business assets. Questions are also asked 
about debt. Part 4 is kept separate from the other parts and we will come back to this. 
Part 5 contains questions about psychological and social factors. It includes the social environ-
ment, expectations about income, the economic situation, health, life expectancy and general at-
titudes to life. 
Part 6, the final part, ends the interview with the standard questions about the interview situation 
and leaves both the person surveyed and the interviewer considerable scope for their own com-
 40
ments. Here we expect comments about confidentiality, the length and accuracy of the question-
naire. Questions are also asked about Internet access and the possibility of conducting a repeat 
survey. 
A survey of this kind is an experiment. Apart from the income and expenditure survey, no Ger-
man survey to date has attempted to produce such an accurate assessment of wealth. When one 
combines this with the numerous questions about psychological and social factors, it provides a 
multi-faceted picture of the household surveyed – indeed it is only such a detailed picture on dif-
ferent levels that will provide information on the complex individual decisions which ultimately 
make up the savings behavior of a household. However, the price of this complex picture is a 
questionnaire, which demands considerable patience and willingness to answer the questions on 
the part of the household. 
SAVE has now been in the field in the years 2001, 2003 and 2004. As a result 5 subsamples are 
currently available – two from the years 2001 and 2003 and one from the year 2004. This survey 
is primarily based on the most recent subsample. The reasons for this are as follows. On the one 
hand, this study required a modification of the questionnaire in order to obtain the precise sub-
jective data about individual life expectancy which was required. On the other hand, this is also 
the latest data available relevant to the reform discussion referred to in section 2.3. In order to in-
crease the available data, values were imputed for the Random Route Sample 2003 from the TPI 
2004 values. Re-surveyed households from TPI 2001 were also compared with each other using 
TPI 2004. This ‘panel comparison’ allows unobservable household or respondent characteristics 
to be eliminated. 
 41
Appendix 2: Regression tables 
 
Table 22: Regression results: Age of retirement and replacement rate 
 Age of retirement  Replacement rate 
  Coefficient P value   Coefficient P value 
Permanent net income / 10,000 -3.090 0.352  0.000 0.121 
(Perm. income/10,000) squared 2.870 0.508  -0.343 0.156 
Age / 10 -0.638 0.218  0.056 0.047 
(Age / 10) squared 0.051 0.383  -0.004 0.219 
Intermediate secondary school leaving 
certificate (D) 0.646 0.003  -0.017 0.162 
Upper secondary school leaving 
certificate (D) 0.538 0.057  -0.027 0.106 
University/polytechnic degree (D) 1.261 0.000  -0.031 0.052 
Children (D) 0.698 0.032  0.005 0.781 
Children living in same household (D) -0.243 0.347  0.003 0.814 
Job: Employee (D) -0.002 0.993  0.002 0.890 
Job: Civil servant (D) -1.888 0.000  0.076 0.000 
In part-time employment (D) 0.064 0.842  -0.025 0.175 
In marginal part-time employment (D) 0.747 0.035  -0.066 0.003 
Not gainfully employed (D) 0.244 0.422  -0.078 0.000 
Unemployed (D) -0.310 0.378  0.041 0.065 
Unemployed for more than one month -0.031 0.895  0.004 0.732 
Unemployed for more than six months 0.020 0.943  -0.011 0.479 
Partner (D) -0.200 0.556  -0.021 0.289 
Separated or divorced (D) -0.106 0.767  -0.021 0.332 
Widowed (D) 0.332 0.350  0.012 0.563 
Sex: female (D) -0.972 0.000  0.002 0.881 
Eastern Germany (D) 0.640 0.014  -0.027 0.054 
Subsample: RR 2003 1.269 0.000  -0.051 0.002 
Subsample: TPI 2004 -0.306 0.200   -0.011 0.415 
Constant 64.582 0.000  0.429 0.000 
Number of observations 1856   941 
Prob > F 4.870  6.630 
F(33, 1100 / F( 20,   661) 0.000  0.000 
R2 0.060  0.148 
Adj. R2 0.048   0.126 
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Table 23: Regression results: Respondents’ life expectancy 
  Coefficient P value 
Permanent income / 10,000 9.056 0.530 
(Permanent income / 10,000) squared -5.140 0.813 
Age / 10 -0.714 0.004 
(Age / 10) squared 0.008 0.002 
Intermediate secondary school leaving certificate (D) -0.426 0.555 
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (D) 0.068 0.942 
University/polytechnic degree (D) -1.092 0.259 
Children (D) 0.572 0.603 
Children living in same household (D) -1.873 0.015 
Job: Employee (D) -0.576 0.542 
Job: Civil servant (D) 1.537 0.238 
Job: Freelancer (D) 3.368 0.240 
Job: Self-employed (D) -0.667 0.589 
Pensioner (D) -4.222 0.007 
In part-time employment (D) -0.004 0.997 
In marginal part-time employment (D) 4.488 0.001 
Not gainfully employed (D) 2.511 0.067 
Unemployed (D) -2.926 0.073 
Unemployed for more than one month 1.140 0.126 
Unemployed for more than six months -2.346 0.014 
Partner (D) -2.157 0.128 
Separated or divorced (D) -0.077 0.953 
Widowed (D) 1.728 0.568 
Sex: female (D) 3.399 0.000 
Eastern Germany (D) -0.835 0.335 
Smoker (D) -0.842 0.243 
Former smoker (D) -1.212 0.075 
Expectations regarding health status 0.229 0.121 
Self appraisal: optimist 0.217 0.077 
Live less long owing to: Illness (D) -5.088 0.000 
Live less long owing to: Life circumstances (D) -1.133 0.426 
Live less long owing to: Early death of family 
member (D) -5.811 0.001 
Live less long owing to: Other reasons (D) -3.884 0.097 
Live longer owing to: Health status (D) 3.583 0.010 
Live longer owing to: Life circumstances (D) 3.842 0.001 
Live longer owing to: Longevity of family members 
(D) 3.341 0.011 
Live longer owing to: Other reasons (D) 4.884 0.009 
Self assessment of risk: Health 0.002 0.982 
Constant 89.902 0.000 
Number of observations 430 
Prob > F 10.60 
F(33, 1100 / F( 20,   661) 0.0000 
R2 0.5074 
Adj. R2 0.460 
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Table 24: Regression results: Partners’ life expectancy 
  Variables von BP  Variables von P 
  Coefficient P value  Coefficient P value 
Permanent income / 10,000 -14.040 0.454   
(Permanent income / 10,000) squared 25.554 0.344   
Age / 10 -0.905 0.003   
(Age / 10) squared 0.010 0.002   
Age difference to partner (Age_P - Age_BP)    0.208 0.022 
Intermediate secondary school leaving certificate 
(D) -0.104 0.902 -0.406 0.616 
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (D) -0.106 0.926 -0.186 0.873 
University/polytechnic degree (D) -1.455 0.216 3.315 0.004 
Children (D) -0.571 0.682   
Children living in same household (D) -1.081 0.265   
Job: Employee (D) -2.162 0.051 -0.859 0.563 
Job: Civil servant (D) -0.516 0.750 -1.549 0.366 
Job: Freelancer (D) 2.978 0.388 -3.426 0.286 
Job: Self-employed (D) -1.350 0.332 0.050 0.986 
Pensioner (D) -2.721 0.120 -0.356 0.798 
In part-time employment (D) 1.565 0.292 1.060 0.341 
In marginal part-time employment (D) 2.910 0.066 -1.614 0.209 
Not gainfully employed (D) -0.685 0.662 0.035 0.977 
Unemployed (D) -2.900 0.124 -1.465 0.378 
Unemployed for more than one month 0.744 0.388 0.400 0.645 
Unemployed for more than six months -0.960 0.392 0.489 0.627 
Separated or divorced (D) 2.285 0.234   
Widowed (D) 2.121 0.722   
Sex: female (D) -4.887 0.000   
Eastern Germany (D) 0.113 0.914   
Expectations regarding health status -0.373 0.099 0.904 0.000 
Self appraisal: optimist 0.473 0.001   
Live less long owing to: Illness (D) -1.227 0.435   
Live less long owing to: Life circumstances(D) 2.953 0.068   
Live less long owing to: Early death of family 
members (D) -3.433 0.115   
Live less long owing to: Other reasons (D) -3.416 0.227   
Live longer owing to: Health status (D) 2.196 0.152   
Live longer owing to: Life circumstances(D) 2.298 0.080   
Live longer owing to: Longevity of family members 
(D) -1.430 0.328   
Live longer owing to: Other reasons (D) 4.480 0.081   
Constant 96.640 0.000      
Number of observations 365 
Prob > F 3.9 
F(33, 1100 / F( 20,   661) 0.0000 
R2 0.3831 
Adj. R2 0.2849 
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Appendix 3: Calculation equations 
A number of methods used in financial mathematics to present future value and annuities were 
applied in sections 3 and 4. The equations used to calculate individual values are presented in 
brief here. 
The future value of a current asset is determined by 
 ( ) ( ) HHrtrittsalteRentenieinHHrtrittsalteRenteniein rVZW += 1 , (2) 
   where 
 ( )HHrtrittsalteRentenieinVZW  represents the future value of an asset V at the age of retirement of the 
household 
 r is the effective rate of interest. 
We assume that savings remain constant at today’s levels every year until retirement. The future 
value of savings at the age of retirement is therefore: 
 ( ) ( )
r
rSSZW
HHHH#
HHrtrittsalteRenteniein
AlterrtrittsalteRenteniein
HH
t
11 −+•=
−
 (3) 
   where 
 ,HHtS  ( )HHrtrittsalteRentenieinS  represents the household’s savings in year t or on retirement. 
The quotient in (3) forms the inverse of the annuity equation as, in this case, constant 
contributions are invested over a specific period of time. 
Assuming that contributions are not paid in annually but on a monthly basis, the following 
modification must be made to (3): 
  ( ) ( )
( )
r
r
r
rSSZW
HHHH#
HHrtrittsalteRenteniein
AlterrtrittsalteRentenieinHH
t 11
1112 12
1
−+•
−+
•=
−
 (4) 
The annuity arising from all the savings accumulated up to the age of retirement, including the 
accrued assets and accrued interest, is calculated as follows: 
 ( ) ( )
( )
r
r
r
rGVZWLR dsjahreRuhes
HH
m
12
1
1tan
11
11
−
+−
+−•+−•=  (5) 
where: HHmLR  = the annuity of a household in month m following retirement 
 ( )GVZW  = the future value of the entire assets 
 Years of retirement = Number of years during which person continues to live following re-
tirement = anticipated life expectancy – age on retirement 
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Design of the subjective life expectancy questions 
Subjective life expectancy is asked in a three step question to keep the level of concern 
about this subject as low as possible. 
The wording of the questions was: 
1. What do you belief: up to what age will men and women of your age live? 
2. When thinking about your living and health situation. What do you believe: 
compared to persons of your gender and age, will you live shorter, about as 
long, longer? 
followed by the question for the number of how many years longer or 
shorter that might be. 
3. If answer to last question was 'shorter' or 'longer': Why do you believe to 
live shorter / longer than the average? 
followed by a list with four possible reasons respondents might think of 
and one open field. 
The interview procedure was repeated in the same way with the respondent's partner. 
When calculating subjective life expectancies, one has to be aware of the gender of the 
person to which the calculation applies (respondent/partner) since the first question 
asks not for the average of persons of the same gender but for both, men and women. 
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